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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter 
originating in the Second District Court, Davis County, Utah. This 
case was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court and the case 
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL 
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs. 
Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs based on the 
following grounds: 1) under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
33, since Plaintiff filed a frivolous appeal that it is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law and 
is one interposed for improper purpose, 2) under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 68(b) since Defendant offered settlement to 
Plaintiff (R.194-195) which was more than what Plaintiff was 
awarded at trial, (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 8, no. 4), and 3) 
under Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-18 since Defendant was the 
prevailing party under Utah's Mechanic Lien Law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case on appeal from the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah. 
In July, 1989, Stacey B. and Kristin P. Morgan (hereinafter 
referred to as Defendants) met with Don Smith at which time it was 
agreed that Don Smith would furnish flooring at or near cost for a 
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home Defendants were purchasing and Defendants agreed to furnish 
air conditioning for Don Smith at or near cost. (R.T.P. 53, 139-
143) . 
Don Smith showed Defendants carpet samples and left samples 
with Defendant for final selection. When Defendants had made a 
selection and the date for closing on Defendant's house neared, 
Defendants were told by Don Smith to contact Floor Coverings by 
Certified, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff) in order to 
arrange for the installation of the carpet and vinyl. (R.T.P. 55, 
144-147). 
Defendant contacted Plaintiff concerning the carpet and vinyl. 
Defendant gave Plaintiff the previously selected carpet and vinyl 
order numbers. Defendant also discussed with Plaintiff where in 
the house the vinyl and carpet should be laid. (R.T.P. 12-15, 149-
151) . 
Later, Plaintiff, without Defendants, went to the home being 
purchased by Defendants and Plaintiff measured the home to 
determine the amount of carpet and vinyl required. (R.T.P 13-14). 
Defendants believed that they were entering into a contract 
with Don Smith concerning the purchase of the vinyl and carpet and 
the selling of an air conditioner to Don Smith. However, Plaintiff 
believed that they were entering into a contract with Defendant for 
the purchase and sell of vinyl and carpet. (Amended Findings of 
Fact, p. 2, no. 4). 
On or about November 15, 16 and 17, 1989, Plaintiff installed 
the carpet and vinyl in the home Defendants were purchasing. 
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(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 3). 
On or about November 24, 1992, Plaintiff purchased the home 
located at 773 South 825 East, Layton, Utah in Davis County. At 
closing on November 24, 1989, the Defendants paid Miles 
Construction Company $1,500.00 for the purchase and installation of 
the carpet and vinyl for their home. (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 
3, no. 9). (R.T.P 155-156). Later, Miles Construction Company 
gave the Defendants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl for their 
home. (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 3, no. 10). 
Plaintiff billed Defendant $11.25 per yard for the purchase 
and installation of carpet and $9.75 per yard for the purchase and 
installation of vinyl, for a total amount of $2,115.00. (Amended 
Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 5 and p. 3, no. 11). 
Defendants disagreed with the amcpunt Plaintiff had billed 
them. They felt they were charged for. more yardage of carpet and 
vinyl than they actually received. Also, Defendant thought that 
the prices to be paid to Plaintiff for the purchase and 
installation of the carpet was $10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard 
to purchase and install the vinyl. (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 
2, no. 6). (R.T.P. 152-155). 
Attempts were made to determine the correct amount owing and 
Defendant received a $75.00 credit. (R.T.P. 156). 
Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien 
to the Defendants about January 3, 1990. (R.115-116). On January 
19, 1990, Floor Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with 
the Office of the Davis County Recorder (Entry No. 880784, Book 
3 
1332, Page 818, hereinafter "Notice of Lien"). (R.l-20). 
Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants in the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah on 
March 15, 1990 requesting relief based on Utah's Mechanic Lien 
Statute, Breach of Contract, Failure to obtain Bond and Quantum 
Meruit. 
Defendants sent to Plaintiff a pro se answer. (R.21-22). 
Later, on June 12, 1990, (51 days prior to judgment and 126 days 
prior to the sheriff's sale), Defendants sent Plaintiff's attorney 
a check for $2,040.00 to be applied towards the vinyl and carpet 
installed in their home by Plaintiff. (Amended Findings of Fact, 
p. 3, no. 13). 
On July 2, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
or, in the Alternative, for an Order Determining Uncontroverted 
Facts and to Strike Answer and for Entry of Default Judgment. 
Plaintiff's attorney filed Affidavits on his Motion for Summary 
Judgment wherein it was alleged that no money had been received 
from Defendants. The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Judgment was entered on August 1, 1990 
awarding Plaintiffs, $3,855.10, which included the principal sum of 
$2,040.00, despite the fact that said amount had already been 
received by Plaintiff's attorney. (R. 23-77). 
On October 18, 1990, Defendants home was sold at a sheriff's 
sale and the property was bid by Plaintiff's attorney for 
$3,855.10. (R.78-79; 98-100). Plaintiff's attorney specifically 
stated at the sale that the bid $3,855.10 was due and owing on the 
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judgment. (R.80-101). 
Defendants attorney at the sale asked Plaintiff's attorney to 
give Defendants credit for $2,040.00 which was previously received. 
Plaintiff's attorney insisted that no check was received and that 
the full amount of the judgment of $3,855.10 was owing. (R.80-
101) . 
Defendants check for $2,040.00 was deposited by Plaintiff's 
attorney after the sheriff's sale. (R.111-113). 
Defendant's attorney motioned the lower court for a temporary 
restraining order to restrain the Davis County Sheriff's Office 
from disposing of the $3,855.10 received by Plaintiff at the sale. 
The court found that the actions of Plaintiff's attorney were 
outrageous and granted a temporary restraining order. (R.T.P. 15, 
R.96-103). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment which 
was granted by the court. (R.80-96; 104-114? 135-136; 140-42). 
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or In the 
Alternative to Strike Defendant's Unsigned Answer, which was 
denied. (R.123-125; 127-129; 146-155; 168-176; 196-197; 201-203). 
A pretrial conference was set for March 25, 1991 at 9:45 a.m. 
At the pretrial conference both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant 
were present. The Court having reviewed the file and discussed 
matters with counsel, ordered that the issues for trial were to be 
as follows: 1) Whether or not the mechanics lien is valid, 2) 
Whether or not the invoice and lien reflects the amount of carpet 
and linoleum installed in Defendant's house, and 3) Whether either 
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party is entitled to attorney fees and how much. (R.158; 198-200) . 
Trial was held before the Honorable Judge Cornaby without a 
jury on May 31, 1991. After counsel were given a chance for 
opening arguments, Plaintiff motioned the court In Limine to 
preclude Defendants from presenting evidence regarding issues which 
were not affirmatively plead. (R.T.P. 2). 
After hearing argument of counsel, (R.T.P. 2-6) the court 
determined that the determining question is whether the parties 
had notice prior to this time as to what the issues were going to 
be. The court said that determining the issues was one of the 
primary purposes of the pretrial. Since the parties had notice of 
the issues from the pre-trial conference, the court denied 
Plaintiff's motion. (R.T.P. 6). 
After the trial was concluded, the court ruled that the amount 
listed as owing on the Notice of Lien is incorrect. (Amended 
Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 23). That the lien statute does not 
require privity between the parties and Plaintiff properly listed 
the Defendants as the owner or reputed owner of the property. 
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 25). That the corporate 
officer did not state under oath that the contents of the lien were 
correct. (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 26). Plaintiff 
incorrectly listed the person by whom he was employed even though 
he believed the Defendants were the ones that hired him. (Amended 
Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 27). That the lien was unenforceable. 
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 28). 
That no one testified as to whether or not there was a bond in 
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place. However, the Court assumed that there was no bond. 
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 24). The court found that 
there was no contract between Plaintiff and Defendant and therefore 
no bond was required. (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 8 and 
Amended Findings of Fact, p. 8, no. 4). 
That even though there was no contract between the parties, 
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 8), Plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment on the basis of unjust enrichment. (Amended Findings of 
Fact, p. 7, no. 29). The Court during trial heard testimony as to 
the value of goods and services received and after weighing the 
testimony (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 5, no. 19 and 20; p. 6, no. 
2 0-26; p. 7, no. 27-29) the court determined that the amount 
Plaintiff was to be paid for unjust enrichment was $1,800.00 plus 
$40.00 preparation and sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to 
be paid of $1,959.60. (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 29). 
That Plaintiff had in his possession $2,040.00 of Plaintiff's 
money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant $80.40. (Amended 
Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 30). That each party is to bear their 
own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. (Amended Findings 
of Fact, p. 7, no. 31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff asserts that the lower court erred for the following 
reasons: 1) Defendants waived their right to assert certain 
defenses, 2) trial court improperly denied Plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien claim, 3) a judgment should have been entered against the 
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Defendants for failure to have a contractors bond, and 4) 
Defendants should not have been permitted to assert defenses at 
trial because they did not sign their answer as required by Rule 
11. 
Plaintifffs allegations are without merit since the trial 
court properly granted judgment to Plaintiff on the basis of unjust 
enrichment. First, Defendants did not waive their right to assert 
certain defenses as proposed by Plaintiff since the issues in 
question were not affirmative defenses but rather part of 
Plaintiff's prima facie case. Second, the trial court properly 
denied Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim since the Notice of Lien 
did not meet statutory requirements since the Notice of Lien was 
not properly verified. Third, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief 
based on Utah's payment bond statute since there was no contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant and therefore the statute does not 
apply. Fourth, Plaintiff cannot assert that Defendants should not 
have been allowed to present evidence in support of their defenses 
at the trial on the basis that Stacey Morgan signed the answer 
prior to trial. Also, the Plaintiff is barred from raising these 
issues on appeal since the issues were not properly preserved for 
appeal. 
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs. 
Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs based on the 
following grounds: 1) under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
33, since Plaintiff filed a frivolous appeal that it is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
8 
good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law and 
is one interposed for improper purpose, 2) under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 68(b) since Defendant offered settlement to 
Plaintiff (R. 194-95) which was more than what Plaintiff was 
awarded at trial, (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 8, no. 4) and 3) 
under Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-18 since Defendant was the 
prevailing party under Utah's Mechanic Lien Law. 
ARGUMENT 
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the 
basis of unjust enrichment. Plaintiff asserts that the lower erred 
for the following reasons: 1) Defendants waived their right to 
assert certain defenses, 2) trial court improperly denied 
Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim, 3) a judgment should have been 
entered against the Defendants for failure to have a contractors 
bond, and 4) Defendants should not have been permitted to assert 
defenses at trial because they did not sign their answer as 
required by Rule 11. However, Plaintiff's allegations are without 
merit and the court properly granted judgment to Plaintiff on the 
basis of unjust enrichment. 
1. Affirmative Defenses Do Not Include Elements of a Plaintiff's 
Prima Facie Case. 
Plaintiff asserts that the validity of the Notice of Lien, and 
other issues concerning non-compliance with the Mechanic's Lien 
statute should not have been brought up at trial since such issues 
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are affirmative defenses and were not plead in Defendants1 answer. 
However, since Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant based 
on the Mechanic's Lien statute (R.l-20), failure to follow the 
requirements of the statute are not affirmative defenses but rather 
part of Plaintiff's prima facie case. 
In American jurisprudence, a Plaintiff has the burden of 
pleading and proving all the elements of its prima facie case. In 
the case before this Court, Plaintiff's Complaint was based in 
part, by a claim that Plaintiff was entitled to relief based on 
Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-1, et seq. 
(1953, as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-1, et seq. (1953, as amended), 
("hereinafter Mechanic's Lien statute")' sets forth the requirements 
that must be met prior to a claimant obtaining any of the benefits 
provided by the statute. 
"Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may 
only acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provisions 
authorizing them." Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 
P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990), quoting Utah Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. 
Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338; 366 P.2d 598, 600 (1961). 
Since a claimant must comply with the statutory provisions 
prior to obtaining a lien, Utah's Mechanic's Lien statute sets 
forth the elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case. No relief can 
be granted prior to Plaintiff pleading and proving the required 
elements contained in the statute. 
One of the requirements prior to obtaining relief under Utah's 
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Mechanicfs Lien statute is that a proper Notice of Lien be filed. 
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-7(2), (1953 as amended). A Notice of 
Lien that is improper is invalid and will not be enforced. 
Worthinaton & Kimball Construction Company et al. v. C & A 
Development Company, 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), First Sec. Mortgage 
Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981), Graff v. Boise Cascade 
Corp. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983). 
Objections to a plaintiff's prima facie case are preserved by 
denials of the allegations contained within the Plaintiff's 
complaint and it is not required to set forth such denials as 
affirmative defenses. 
"A defense that merely controverts plaintiff's prima 
facie case is negative in character and should be pleaded 
in accordance with Rule 8(b) and Rule 8(c) then becomes 
inapplicable, for an affirmative defense raises matters 
outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case. . . 
.Therefore, any matter that does- not tend to controvert 
the opposing party's prima facie case shall be pleaded, 
and is not put in issue by a denial made pursuant to Rule 
8(b)" General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). 
Plaintiff's contention that it cart obtain relief under the 
Mechanic's Lien statute without proving that it complied with the 
statute's requirements is wrong. The statute sets forth the prima 
facie elements of Plaintiff's case. Failure to comply with the 
statute's requirements is not an affirmative defense, but rather 
part of Plaintiff's prima facie case. Plaintiff has the burden of 
proving that it complied with the statute's requirements. 
2. Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was Improper and did not meet the 
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Requirements of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly denied 
Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim, since the requirements of the 
statute were met since it substantially complied with the statute's 
requirements. Although substantial compliance is allowed under the 
law, the trial court properly found the Mechanic's Lien Statute 
does not apply since the Notice of Lien was invalid due to improper 
verification, incorrect amount requested and Plaintiff incorrectly 
listed the person by whom he was employed. 
As in this case, improper verification alone is sufficient to 
support a finding that the Mechanic's Lien Statute does not apply 
since the Notice was defective. In this case, the Notice of Lien 
filed by the Plaintiff was improper since to have a valid 
verification as required by statute, the claimant, rather than 
notary, must sign that the contents are true. Plaintiff did not 
sign that the contents of the Lien were true, and therefore 
according to recent case law, the Lien is invalid and cannot be 
enforced. 
Utah's Mechanic Lien statute sets forth the requirements of 
the Notice of Claim which include: 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting 
forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if 
not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed 
or to whom he furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or 
service was performed or the first and last equipment or 
material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
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authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as 
required under Chapter 3, Titled 57. No acknowledgment or 
certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 
1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-7(2), (1953 as amended). 
The exact procedure for verification has not been set by 
statute but rather by recent case law. The trial court properly 
determined that the signature of the Notice of Lien was not 
properly acknowledged as required in Sect. 38-1-7(2)(e) and 
therefore determined that it was invalid. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien is invalid since it was improperly 
acknowledged since the claimant signing the lien did not 
acknowledge that the contents were true. However, in order to have 
a valid verification it is the claimant, and not the notary, who 
must sign that the contents are true. 
The issue of the validity of the Plaintiff's Notice of Lien 
has clearly been decided in Worthinaton & Kimball v., C & A Dev. 
Co., 777 P.2d at 475. In Worthinaton, "the lien claimant did not 
sign a correct written oath in the presence of a notary. All that 
he signed was the notice of lien. It. . . [did] not purport to 
contain an oath. Affixed below the claimant's signature the 
following certification appear[ed]: 
STATE OF UTAH) 
County of Salt Lake) 
On this 13th day of January 1982, Personally appeared 
before me Edwin N. Kimball [sic], who duly acknowledged to me 
that he has executed this notice and that he has read the 
contents thereof, that the same is true of his own knowledge. 
13 
/s/ Arnold Allred 
Notary Public 
residing at 6586 W. 3500 S. 
(seal) 
My Commission expires 
18 Sept 85 
The forgoing was not signed by the claimant, but was signed 
instead by the notary public. It is a cert if iccition by a notary 
public that the claimant acknowledged /to him that he executed the 
notice of lien, that he had read the contents, and that the same 
were true. However, in order to have a valid verification it is 
the claimant, and not the notary, who must sign that the contents 
are true." Id. at 477. 
In Worthinaton, the court determined that the Notice of Lien 
was not properly verified and therefore did not meet the 
requirements of the statute. The claimant was therefore denied 
relief under the statute. 
The case before this court has the same facts as Worthington. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was signed as follows: 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY 
CERTIFIED, INC. 
/s/ Wavne Dudley /s/ Alan Delahuntv 
(SEAL) Secretary Authorized Officer 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On this 19th day of January 1990, before me, the undersigned 
notary, personally appeared Alan Delahunty, Vice President of Floor 
Coverings by Certified, Inc., who is personally known to me (or 
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whose identity was satisfactorily proved to me) to be the person 
who signed the preceding document in my presence and who swore or 
affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily for its stated 
purpose, that the document is truthful, and that the document was 
signed on behalf of said corporation by the authority of a 
Resolution of the corporation's board of directors and acknowledged 
that the corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is 
the seal of said corporation. [Emphasis added]. 
/s/ 
Notary Public 
(SEAL) My Commission Expires: 3/22/92 
The claimant did not verify that the contents were true, but 
rather the notary public claims that he was told they were true. 
The fatal defect is that the claimant did not sign anything under 
oath. Under the rule determined in Worthincrton. the defect is 
fatal and the Notice of Lien is invalid. 
Utah courts have mandated that the Notice of Lien be properly 
verified. In Graff, 660 P.2d at 722, the court stated that "the 
requirement of verification. . .is not a hypertechnicality that the 
Court is free to discount, but that verification is a mandatory 
condition precedent to the very creation and existence of a lien." 
Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift. 798 P.2d at 738. 
Michelsen v. Craicrco. Inc.. 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiff sets forth In re. . Williamson. 43 B.R. 813 
(Bktrcy.Ct.D. Utah 1984) as a case which exhibits a similar lien 
which was held to be enforceable. The United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah is not controlling in this court. 
The trial court properly held that the Notice of Lien was not 
proper. Plaintiff's lien was improperly verified and the 
mechanic's lien claim was properly denied. 
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III. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF FOR FAILURE TO OBTAIN 
A CONTRACTORS BOND. 
Plaintiff asserts that a judgment should have been entered 
against the Defendants for failure to have a contractors bond. 
However Plaintiff is not entitled relief based on Utah's payment 
bond statute since this issue was not properly raised at trial in 
order to preserve the issue for appeal and also since there was no 
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, and therefore the statute 
does not apply in this case. 
1. Plaintiff May Not Raise Issues 6n Appeal Which Were Not 
Properly Preserved at Trial. 
Prior to trial, the Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant's 
attorney attended a pretrial conference. At the pretrial 
conference and after discussion by both attorneys the court 
determined that the issues of the case be limited to certain issues 
at trial. The issues certified for trial were 1) Whether or not 
the mechanics lien is valid, 2) Whether or not the invoice and lien 
reflects the amount of carpet and linoleum installed in Defendant's 
house, and 3) Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and 
how much. (R. 158; 198-200) 
Plaintiff did not object to the issues certified for trial at 
any time prior to trial. However, Plaintiff now contends that the 
court should have ruled in Plaintiff's favor on the basis of 
failure to obtain a payment bond. Since the issue was not properly 
presented to the court at trial, the court was proper in not making 
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a ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment based on the 
statute. 
In Parker v. General Motors Corporation, 503 P.2d 148, 149 
(Utah 1972), the court condemned the practice of parties trying to 
resurrect issues rejected by the trial court. In Parker, the 
issues finally resolved by pre-trial conference were principally 
negligence and breach of warranty. After the case was set for 
trial, plaintiffs received a hearing for the purpose of asking the 
court for the third time to permit the issues that had been 
rejected. The court determined that under our procedural system, 
last minute efforts to resurrect issues long since rejected by the 
court is not allowed. Id. at 149. 
"Parties may limit the scope of the litigation if they choose, 
and if an issue is clearly withheld, the court cannot nevertheless 
adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief." Combe v. Warren's 
Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984). 
The parties in this case limited the issues to those set forth 
in the Pre-trial Order. If Plaintiff objected to the Pre-trial 
Order, Plaintiff needed to timely file objections. Making such 
objections for the first time on appeal is improper. 
Defendant relied on the Pretrial Order by limiting the 
evidence presented at trial- to the issues ordered by the court in 
the Pretrial Order. By not properly raising and presenting this 
issue at the trial, Defendant was not given the opportunity to 
present evidence which would refute any claim under the Bond 
statute. E.g., Defendant Stacey Morgan stated in his testimony 
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that he believed that Miles Construction Company had obtained a 
payment bond. If this was true there would be no need for 
Defendant to obtain one, since the statute would be complied with. 
See Pierce, et al. v. Pepper, et al.. 405 P.2d 345 (Utah 1965). 
Since this issue was not raised in the Pre-trial Order, Defendant 
did not present evidence which would refute Plaintiff's claim that 
a payment bond was required. 
Since the issues set for trial were limited to those set in 
the Pre-trial Order, and Plaintiff did not timely object to those 
issues Plaintiff is now barred from raising the issue on appeal. 
2. Utah's Payment Bond Requirement is not Applicable to Claimants 
Not Party to a Contract. 
Even if this court determines that Plaintiff properly raised 
the issue of Defendant's requirement to obtain a Payment Bond in 
order to preserve the issue for appeal, Defendant was not required 
to obtain a payment bond since Plaintiff and Defendant never 
entered into a contract. 
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1, (1953 as amended) provides that 
"before any contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the 
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or 
improvement upon land is awarded to any contractor, the owner shall 
obtain from the contractor a payment bond complying with Subsection 
(3)." 
Cases interpreting the statute have interpreted a literal 
meaning to "before any contract" wording in the statute. The 
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courts have held that the bond statute requires that a contract be 
formed between owner and contractor, otherwise a claimant is not 
entitled to relief under its provisions. 
In Bailev v. Parker, 778 P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 1989), the 
Court found there was no contract and therefore no rights accrued 
to plaintiff under this statute. The court stated that "in order 
to be a protected materialman under section 14-2-1, there must be 
a contract between the property owner and the person with whom he 
contracts, for the construction, alteration, or repair of a 
structure, and materials supplied. . . . " [Emphasis added]. Id. 
at 1007. Lawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. 27 
Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972). See Matern v. Phillips, 335 P.2d 
839 (Utah 1959), See Harries v. Valgardson, 432 P.2d 58 (Utah 
1967). 
Whether or not there was a contract is an issue of fact. The 
trial court heard the evidence and determined there was no contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Amended Findings of Fact, p.2, 
no. 8). 
Since the trial court found that there was no contract between 
the parties, it would be improper for relief to be granted based 
upon the payment bond requirement of Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1 
(1953, as amended). 
3. Utahfs Payment Bond Requirement is not Applicable when Less 
than the $2.000 Minimum Requirement has been Met. 
Even if this court finds that there was a contract between the 
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parties, Defendant has disputed that they owe Plaintiff more than 
$2,000. The at trial, the issue of determining whether or not the 
invoice and lien reflected the amount of carpet and linoleum 
installed in Defendant's house was litigated. The lower court came 
to the factual determination that the invoice or Lien did not have 
the correct amount listed since the court held that $1,959.60 was 
the proper amount owing Plaintiff. Unless such a finding is 
against the clear weight of the evidence, payment bond was not 
required since the statutory $2,000 minimum requirement had not 
been met. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1(2) (1953, as amended). 
In sum, Plaintiff cannot be allowed to assert that the lower 
court erred in not ruling that Defendant was required to obtain a 
payment bond since 1) the issue was not proper preserved for 
appeal, 2) the statute is not applicable to parties who have not 
entered into a contract, and 3) the statute is not applicable 
unless the $2,000 minimum requirement has been met. 
IV. PLAINTIFF CANNOT RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL THAT WERE NOT PROPERLY 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants should not have been 
permitted to assert defenses at trial because they did not sign 
their answer as required by Rule 11. Defendant Stacey Morgan 
signed the answer prior to trial and also, this issue was not 
properly raised at trial in order to preserve the it for appeal. 
On March 25, 1991, both Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's 
counsel attended a pretrial conference concerning this case. In 
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that conference it was determined what issues would be presented 
for trial. Those issues include: 1) whether or not the mechanics 
lien is valid, 2) whether or not the invoice and lien reflects the 
amount of carpet and linoleum installed in Defendant's house and 3) 
Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and how much. 
(Pre-trial Order, p. 2). 
Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must 
clearly show that it was timely presented to trial court in manner 
sufficient to obtain ruling thereon; issues not raised in trial 
court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding Court of 
Appeals from considering their merits on appeal. Salt Lake County 
v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989). 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must 
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon. Matters not 
presented to the trial court.may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983). 
"The burden is on the parties to make certain that the record 
they compile will adequately preserve their arguments for 
review....11 Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson. Inc. , 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah 
App. 1991), quoting Franklin, at 1045. 
In Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinqer. 793 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 
1990) the Court determined that it could not properly base its 
decision on legal issues not specified by parties in written Pre-
trial Order where no objection was made to introduction of evidence 
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which formed basis for court's resolution of case. Id. at 395. 
Last minute effort by party before trial to resurrect issues 
previously rejected by trial court or to delay the trial on the 
basis of issues that have been rejected was not allowed. Parker v. 
General Motors Corporation. 503 P.2d at 149. 
"Parties may limit the scope of the litigation if they choose, 
and if an issue is clearly withheld, the court cannot nevertheless 
adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief." Combe, at 736. 
Since the Pre-trial Order specified the issues to be litigated 
at trial and the issue of the effect of an unsigned answer was not 
included, such an issue cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
V. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS APPEAL. 
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs. 
Defendant claims such right on the basis that: 1) Plaintiff's 
appeal is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees 
and double costs pursuant to Utah R. App.P. Rule 33, 2) Plaintiff 
refused Defendants' settlement offer Which was more than what 
Plaintiff received through judgment and therefore, pursuant to Rule 
68(b), Defendant is entitled to a minimum of the costs incurred, 
and 3) Defendant prevailed against Plaintiff concerning the 
Mechanic's Lien and therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-
1-18 (1953, as amended), Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees 
and costs. 
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1. Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to 
attorney's fees and double costs. 
Under R. Utah Ct. App. 33, Plaintiff's appeal is deemed 
frivolous when it is brought without reasonable legal or factual 
basis Call v. Citv of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Utah App. 
1990), Mauahn v. Mauahn. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). 
Attorney's fees are allowed in egregious cases which are obviously 
without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and would 
result in the delay of a proper judgment. Id. 
Plaintiff's appeal is without merit since the issues raised 
have been well settled by Utah law and has resulted in the delay of 
proper judgment and therefore Defendant respectfully requests the 
court to grant attorney's fees and double costs. 
2. Plaintiff refused Defendants' Settlement Offer and therefore. 
Defendant is Entitled to Costs Incurred. 
Defendant is entitled to costs based on Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 68(b). Defendants offered Plaintiff a settlement 
prior to trial on May 7, 1991, in the amount of $1,950.00, plus 
$1,000.00 attorney's fees, plus costs of constable and filing of 
the Complaint. Pursuant to U.R.C.P., Rule 68(b), since the offer 
was not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the Plaintiff 
was not more than what was offered prior to trial, the Plaintiff 
must pay costs incurred after the making of the offer and other 
relief as defined by the statute. 
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3. Under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law, Defendant Prevailed and is 
Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs, 
Defendant is also entitled to attorney's fees and costs based 
on Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-17 (1953, as amended) and Sect. 38-1-
18 (1953, as amended) since the statute requires that "[i]n any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as 
costs in the action." Id. 38-1-18. ". . . [T]he court shall 
apportion the costs according to the right of the case. . . . Id. 
38-1-17. Since Defendant prevailed on this action which was 
brought to enforce a lien under Sect. 38-1-18, Defendant is 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that the lower Court's 
decision be affirmed since Plaintiff's objections contained in this 
appeal are without merit. Plaintiff's assertion that the lower 
court was barred from determining that there were defects in 
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien is unfounded since such an issue is not 
an affirmative defense but rather part of Plaintiff's prima facie 
case. Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant based on the 
Mechanic's Lien statute and failure to follow the requirements of 
the statute are not affirmative defenses but rather part of 
Plaintiff's prima facie case. 
Plaintiff's assertion that the trial court improperly denied 
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Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim, on the basis that the 
requirements of the statute were met since the Plaintiff proposes 
that substantial compliance was met is unfounded since the Notice 
of Lien was not properly verified and therefore invalid. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was not proper since the claimant, 
rather than notary, must sign that the contents are true. 
Plaintiff did not sign that the contents of the Lien were true, and 
therefore according to recent case law, the Lien is invalid and 
cannot be enforced. 
Plaintiff's assertion that a judgment should have been entered 
against the Defendants for failure to have a contractors bond is 
unfounded. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief based on Utah's 
payment bond statute since this issue was not properly raised at 
trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal and also since 
there was no contract and less than $2,000 worth of goods and 
services were received, and therefore the statute does not apply. 
Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants should not have been 
permitted to assert defenses at trial because they did not sign 
their answer as required by Rule 11 is unfounded. Defendant Stacey 
Morgan signed the answer prior to trial and this issue was not 
properly raised at trial in order to preserve the it for appeal and 
therefore, this issue is moot. 
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs. 
Defendant claims such right on the basis of: 1) Plaintiff's appeal 
is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and 
double costs pursuant to Utah R. App.P. Rule 33, 2) Plaintiff 
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On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs. 
Defendant claims such right on the basis of: 1) Plaintiff's appeal 
is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and 
double costs pursuant to Utah R. App.P. Rule 33, 2) Plaintiff 
refused Defendants' settlement offer which was more than what 
Plaintiff received through judgment and therefore, pursuant to Rule 
68(b), Defendant is entitled to costs incurred, and other relief 
defined by statute, and 3) Defendant prevailed against Plaintiff 
concerning the Mechanic's Lien and therefore, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sect. 38-1-18 (1953, as amended), Defendant is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. 
Therefore, Defendant requests that this court affirm the lower 
court's ruling and award Defendant attorney's fees and double 
costs. 
DATED this A\i"\ day of June, 199 
A. 
ste^encT 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3314 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendants 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84 041 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747303CN 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st 
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District 
Court Judge. The Plaintiff was present and represented by his 
attorney, Paul Franklin Farr. The Defendants were also present and 
represented by their attorney, Steven C. Vanderlinden. The court 
having heard testimony by both parties, and their witnesses, and 
having received exhibits as evidence, and the court having reviewed 
the testimony of the parties and good cause appearing, hereby 
enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Defendants are residents of Davis County, Utah. 
2. The Plaintiff was a corporation duly organized and 
validly existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its 
EXHIBIT 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
was, at all times relevant, in the retail floor coverings business 
[hereinafter referred to sometimes as "Floor Coverings11]. 
3. On or about the 15th day of November, 1989, Plaintiff 
furnished the first materials and labor and, on or about November 
17, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and labor 
in performing the job [Invoice 2702] at the Property. 
4. The property located at 773 South 825 East in Davis 
County, Utah [hereinafter the "Property"] was a residence, and the 
Defendants1 closed on their purchase of the same on November 24, 
1991. Defendants were the owners of said Property at the tine the 
Notice of Lien was recorded against the same. 
5. That Plaintiff thought the prices to be paid to them for 
the installation and the purchase of the carpet was $11.25 and the 
price to be paid for the purchase and the installation of vinyl was 
$9.75. 
6. That the Defendant thought that the price to be paid to 
Plaintiff for the purchase and installation of the carpet was 
$10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard to purchase and install the 
vinyl. 
7. That the Defendants believed they were entering into a 
contract with Don Smith and the Plaintiff believed they were 
entering into a contract with the Defendants. 
8. That no contract existed between the Plaintiff and 
Defendants. 
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9. On November 24, 1989, at the closing of the Defendant's 
me the Defendants paid Miles Construction Company Contractor 
W\ TOO.OO for the purchase and installation of the carpet and vinyl 
^ , their home. 
10. In June, 1990, Miles Construction Company gave the 
ndants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl that was purchased 
their home so that the Defendants could send the money on to the 
plaintiff. 
11. Plaintiff sent the Defendants an invoice [Invoice No. 
16702], relating to said job, shortly after the work was completed 
S^ n November 17, 1990 seeking the immediate payment of the same. 
|Eke ar.ount asserted to be owing therein was $2,115.00. 
12. Since said invoice was not paid by Defendants, then 
^Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien to 
^he Defendants about January 3, 1990. On January 19, 1990, Floor 
Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with the Office of 
^the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 880784, Book 1332, Page 818, 
^tereinafter "Notice of Lien"]. 
13. On June 12, 1990, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for 
V^, 040. 00 for the carpet and vinyl purchased and installed in their 
^*Owe by the Plaintiff. 
14. That the Plaintiff urged the Court to find an accord and 
^^tisfaction pursuant to the Answer filed by the defendants on 
^ r i l 9, 19 90. The Court did not do so. This action was filed on 
^^Vch 15, 1990. On March 23, 1990, Allen Delahunty and Stacy 
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Morgan met at the property. A step was repaired and the floor was 
remeasured. At the conclusion the Plaintiff agreed to deduct 
$75.00 from the bill due to its error. The balance due was 
$2,040.00. 
15. That on June 26, 1990, the Court received the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike Defendants' Answer, and for 
default judgment. Also filed on the same date was an Affidavit 
signed by Alan Delahunty. The Plaintiff's attorney also signed 
this Affidavit wherein he claimed to have mailed a copy to the 
Defendants on May 18, 1990. That on June 10, 1990, the Defendants 
mailed to Plaintiff's attorney, Paul Franklin Farr, a check for 
$2,040.00 to settle the matter. The Defendants mailed the 
$2,040.00 check to the Plaintiff in an offer to settle the case, 
although no writing expressed such intention. The Court awarded 
the Plaintiff judgment on August 1, 1990 for $2,040.00 plus $136.00 
interest, plus lien costs $100.00, plus lien foreclosure costs of 
$308.00, plus a reasonable attorney fee of $1,000.00. The total 
was $3,584.00. The Plaintiff's counsel held Defendants' check 
until after the judgment was awarded and then cashed it on August 
7, 1990. On October 11, 1990, Steven C. Vanderlinden made an 
appearance for the Defendants and filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
Summary Judgment. On October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff caused a 
public sale to be made of Defendants property pursuant to the 
judgment. The Plaintiff's attorney bid $3,855.10 at the public 
sale, claiming that to be the amount owing. The Court found the 
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actions of Plaintiff's attorney outrageous and granted a temporary 
restraining order. 
16. That Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that 
they owed the Plaintiff money for the carpet and vinyl installed 
in their home but have consistently claimed it was less than the 
$2,115.00 claimed by Plaintiff. 
17. That the Plaintiff billed the Defendant for 50 yards of 
vinyl at $9.75 per yard for a total of $487.50 and 130 yards of 
carpet at $11.25 per yard for a total of $1,463.53. The total for 
both the carpet and vinyl was $1,951.00 before taxes, and $2,115.00 
with taxes and $40.00 miscellaneous fees. 
18. That after the liens had been filed, Plaintiff 
acknowledged a $75.00 error in its calculations and stated that his 
bill should be $2,040.00. 
19. That because there was no contracr between the parties, 
and different prices were discussed, the Court determined that 
$9.75 per yard for the purchase and installation of the vinyl is 
reasonable and $11.25 for the purchase and installation of the 
carpet is reasonable. 
20. Three expert witnesses were called on the total yardage 
of carpet and vinyl installed in the home, none being a party to 
the lawsuit. Said witnesses testified that they went to the home 
to measure the carpet. Dennis Vanderlinden testified that there 
was 121.3 yards of carpet installed with a value of $1,364.94, and 
40 yards of vinyl installed for a purchase price of $390.00 and a 
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total price of the carpet and vinyl of $1,754.94. David Searle 
testified that there was 122.2 yards of carpet for a value of 
$1,374-75 and 45 yards of vinyl for a value of $438.75 for a total 
purchase price for both the carpet and vinyl of $1,813.50. Dean 
Chidester testified that there was 118.67 yards of carpet for a 
value of $1,335.04 and 40 yards of vinyl for a value of $390.00 for 
a total purchase price of $1,725.04. 
21. That the difference between the high and the low figures 
testified to in court is approximately $150.00. 
22. That the difference in the amount owed is significant to 
the Defendants. 
23. That the amount owed in the notice lien is incorrect. 
24. That no one testified as to whether cr not there was a 
bond in place. However, the Court assumes that there was no bond. 
25. That the lien statute does not require privity between 
the parties and Plaintiff properly listed the Defendants as the 
owner or reputed owner of the property. 
26. That the lien filed by the Plaintiff correctly stated 
when the labor was performed, November 17, 1989, and gave a proper 
description of the property, however, the signature of the 
corporation is the signature of an officer only. The corporate 
officer does not state under oath that the contents of the lien are 
correct. The notary on the lien is the person who states "who 
swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily, for its 
stated purpose, and the document is truthful." 
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27. That Plaintiff incorrectly listed the person by whom he 
was employed even though he believed the Defendants were the ones 
that hired him. 
28. That based on the above, the lien is unenforceable. 
29. Plaintiff is to be paid for unjust enrichment in the 
amount of $1,800.00 plus $40.00 preparation and the appropriate 
sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to be paid of $1,959.60. 
30. That Plaintiff presently has in his possession $2,040.00 
of Plaintiff's money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant 
$80.40. 
31. That each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
32. That the previous sum deposited with the Court in the 
amount of $3,855.10 is to be returned to the Defendants. 
33. Shortly after the work was completed on November 17, 
1990, Plaintiff mailed Defendants1 Invoice 2702, seeking the 
immediate payment of the same. The Plaintiff asserted that 
$2,115.00 was the correct principal amount then due and owing. 
34. Thereafter, no payment was made by the Defendants within 
the next thirty days. As a result, Plaintiff contacted Defendants 
to request payment. 
35. In this case no payment was thereafter made and Plaintiff 
sent Defendants a Preliminary Notice of Intent to file a lien. 
36. In the sale of the carpeting for installation at the 
Property, Plaintiff acted with the expectation of being compensated 
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therefor in an amount equal to the reasonable value of the 
materials and services furnished, and it was not acting as a 
volunteer. 
37. The Notice of Lien was filed within the time required by 
the mechanics1 lien statute and on or about January 19, 1990, 
Plaintiff mailed a copy of said Notice of Lien to Defendants by 
certified mail. 
38. The Lien showed what the Plaintiff believed at the time 
the Lien was prepared and recorded[that the principal amount due 
and owing was the sum of $2,115.00]. 
The Court having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT, hereby enters 
its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the District Court had jurisdiction over the above-
entitled matter. 
2. That Plaintiff's lien filed in the above-entitled lien 
is void and unenforceable. 
3. That there was no contract existing between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendants and therefore no bond was necessary. 
4. That the Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $1,959.60 
on the theory of unjust enrichment. 
5. That the Defendant has previously tendered to the 
Plaintiff $2,040.00 leaving a net amount due and owing to the 
Defendant of $8 0.40. 
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6. That the Defendant is entitled to receive back the check 
previously deposited with the Court in the amount of $3,855.10. 
7. That neither party is entitled to attorneyfs fees or 
court costs. 
DATED this day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Douglas L. Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE 
To: Paul Franklin Farr 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Busch Forum, Suite 540 
5295 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711 
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the rules of the 
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504, you have five (5) days after 
receipt of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ and 
Judgment to file an Objection. 
DATED this zz ru day of Qefai*, 1991. 
en C. Vanderlinden 
c:\wp\docs\mi sc\morgan.fof 
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1 FARMINGTON, UTAH, FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991 
2 * * * * * 
3 THE COURT: The Court will make the following findings 
4 and decision in this matter: 
5 First, the Court does not find a contract between 
6 the plaintiff and defendants. It's clear from the believable 
7 testimony given to the Court that the defendants believed 
8 they were contracting with Don Smith. The plaintiff believed 
9 he was contracting with the defendants. 
10 But the fact that they each believed they were 
11 contracting with somebody else doesn't mean there's a 
12 contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
13 Don Smith has not been made a party to this action, 
14 so nothing the Court says with regard to him has any binding 
15 effect on his legal interests. Miles Construction Company 
16 has not been made a party to the action, and so, of course, 
17 nothing I say has any binding effect on Miles Construction 
18 Company. 
19 The defendants were not acting as agents for 
20 Miles Construction Company. Miles Construction Company was 
21 the actual owner of the lot at the time the work was done. 
22 They had entered into an earnest money agreement with the 
23 defendants to purchase that lot — or I should say to 
24 purchase the lot and the house that was being built on it. 
25 Richard Miles testified that having reviewed his 
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1 files, he could see where there was a $1,206 flooring 
2 allotment. Apparently those who work with Miles Construction 
3 Company which is a corporation determined that the amount 
4 apparently had been agreed to be higher than that. The 
5 amount ultimately paid the defendants for that work was 
6 $1500. 
7 The defendants became owners of the property on 
8 November 24th, 1989, when the closing was signed. No matter 
9 what the defendants believed, the Court does not find that 
10 Don Smith ordered the vinyl and carpet from the plaintiff, 
11 nor was he an agent for the defendants. Don Smith needed his 
12 air conditioning repaired, and the defendants agreed to 
13 scratch his back if they, in turn, could get their back 
14 scratched. 
15 Defendant Stacey Morgan has testified that he gave 
16 him some air conditioning worth approximately 1200 for which 
17 he paid $800, which in the company he had! a right to do. And 
18 for that, he just expected that the defendant — not the 
19 defendant. He expected that Don Smith was going to do the 
20 same thing for him when it came to carpeting. As I say, 
21 carpeting, I mean carpeting and vinyl. 
22 I I believe the actual agreement was that the 
23 | defendants believed they were contracting with Don Smith. 
24 | Don Smith was walking a tight rope. He didn't want retailers 
25 I to believe that he was selling carpet without going through a 
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1 retailer, and so he went to the plaintiff and asked the 
2 plaintiff to do him a favor by supplying carpet and vinyl to 
3 the defendants at a given price. 
4 The defendants have testified that they had a set 
5 price of $10.75 per yard installed for carpet and 9.75 per 
6 yard for vinyl. 
7 Plaintiff on the other hand, and the Court's not 
8 sure where he got his information from because Ifm not 
9 persuaded he got it from the defendants. I think he — Well, 
10 he may have got his information from Don Smith. But he 
11 believed that he was to supply vinyl at 9.75 per yard, which, 
12 of course, is the same, and carpeting at 11.25 per yard, each 
13 of those being the installed price. That means there's no 
14 contract between the plaintiff and defendants. 
15 The defendants have acknowledged since this case 
16 first began that they were — at the time the lien was filed, 
17 at least at all times after November 24th, 1989, they were 
18 the owners of the property. That when they paid for that 
19 house, they also paid Miles Construction Company for the 
20 installation of the flooring; that the amount they were 
21 talking about was $1500, though I'm not sure the defendants 
22 even knew the figure at that time, but that's the figure that 
23 Miles Construction ultimately gave them. 
24 Richard Miles who seems to say at the time that the 
25 defendants were trying to get their carpet and vinyl 
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1 installed, they had a figure of 1206 or $1,206 to work from. 
2 In my finding I don't think it makes any difference. 
3 Ultimately, they were paid man]^ months after this 
4 action was filed. Probably in the month of June 1990, the 
5 defendants were paid $1500 by Miles Construction Company for 
6 the flooring. 
7 It's clear from the evidence that the carpet was 
8 installed beginning on November 15th, 1989. It took three 
9 days to install it, was finished on November 17th, 1989. 
10 It's clear the plaintiff has a regular procedure 
11 which he used in this case to collect, which is when he 
12 finishes a job, he bills the parties for it and expects 
13 immediate payment. 
14 Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the contract or at least 
15 it's a contract form dated November the 8th, 1989, that is 
16 sent to the — I suppose it's a document that was sent to the 
17 defendants showing the amount of $2,115 due and owing. 
18 His next procedure he says is when he doesn't 
19 receive pay as soon as he thinks he should, about 30 days 
20 later, he makes a phone call, which he did. 
21 That sometime after that, he sends them out a 
22 preliminary notice that he's going to file a lien, and he did 
23 I that on January 3rd, 1990, by Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. And 
24 | then he has a lien drawn which he files on January 19th, 
25 11990, dated the same day which he asks specifically for the 
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1 amount of $2,115. 
2 Now, there's been a considerable amount of 
3 controversy here on what the value of the work done was. I 
4 don't think there's any question from the testimony given 
5 that the defendants believed that they were being charged too 
6 much right from the beginning. 
7 Plaintiff has urged the Court to find that there 
8 was accord and satisfaction as evidenced by the answer filed 
9 on April 9th, 1990, specifically the third paragraph which 
10 said "On March 23rd, 1990, we reached an agreement with 
11 Floorcoverings regarding disputed invoice and service." 
12 Now, this action was filed on March 15th, 1990. I 
13 don't recall right offhand the date the 2,040 was actually 
14 sent. Wasn't it in June? 
15 MR. FARR: June. 
16 MR. VANDERLINDEN: It was, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Do you remember the dates? Somebody 
18 remember the dates? 
19 MR. FARR: June 12th is when I received it. 
20 THE COURT: Plaintiff received it on June 12th, of 
21 course, and it was payable to Mr. Farr personally apparently 
22 at his request. I'm aware that the plaintiff accepted that 
23 document or that amount at apparently counsel's suggestion. 
24 It was held until there was a judgment taken on the case. 
25 I And shortly thereafter, then it was applied toward the 
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1 judgment. 
2 If one looks at that as an accord and satisfaction, 
3 certainly, then, the acceptance of that $2,040 ended the suit 
4 right then and there for 2,040 for everything. The Court 
5 finds that there was no accord and satisfaction. There could 
6 have been if the parties had been willing to agree at that 
7 time. 
8 Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning 
9 they owed some money. They have disputed the amount. Now, 
10 the Court's allowed — we've taken testimony from several 
11 people. The plaintiff or at least Mr. Delahunty on behalf of 
12 the plaintiff testified that the vinyl was 50 yards at 9.75 
13 or $9.75 per yard which is $487.50. 
14 And all of these you're going to have, if my math 
15 is right, my figures will be right. And if they're not, it's 
16 just a math error. 
17 Carpet at 11.25 at 130 yards 1,462.50 for a total 
18 of 1,950. 
19 Plaintiff acknowledged an error in calculating the 
20 carpeting which all of the parties have agreed was in error, 
21 recalculated it and later giving a $75 credit to the 
22 defendants. 123.33 yards is the figure that I accepted as 
23 the final amount at 11.25 per yard which is $1,387.47 plus 
24 J the vinyl makes it a total at that time of 1,874.94. 
25 | Now, through all of these calculations that I give 
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1 to you, I'm always going to use the figures of 9.75 for the 
2 vinyl and 11.25 for the carpet, irrespective of the fact that 
3 the defendants testified they think there contract is for 
4 10.75. I do that because I've previously found that there is 
5 no contract between the parties. And I believe the 9.75 to 
6 be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the vinyl and 11.25 
7 to be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the carpet. 
8 Dennis Vanderlinden figured carpet at 121.33 yards 
9 which figures out at $1,364.97. He figured the vinyl at 
10 40 yards which comes to $390 for a total of $1754.97. 
11 David Seare figured the vinyl at 42 yards — or 
12 45 yards. He says give or take three yards. And I said 
13 "Does that mean 42 yards?" And he said "No. That means 
14 45 yards to 48 yards." So he distinctly said it didn't mean 
15 42 yards. That's my understanding. 
16 I figured his at 45 because that is the figure he 
17 used. That's the figure he determined. And when he gave 
18 that testimony, he said that 45 yard measurement included in 
19 the area of the cabinets and included the counting of pattern 
20 match. So David Seare figures I have at $438.75 for the 
21 vinyl, $1374.75 for the carpet which was at 122.2 yards for a 
22 total of $1813.50. 
23 J Dean Chidester figured the vinyl at 40 yards for 
24 ( $390, 118.67 yards of carpet for $1335.04 for a total of 
25 | $1725.04. So the difference between the high and the low, 
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1 this is just roughly $150 with four different people giving 
2 the figures. 
3 Now, the plaintiff has argued that as long as you 
4 file a lien it doesn't matter how much you claim because 
5 that's not important* 
6 It seems to the Court it's just very essentially 
7 important in a case of this nature. The lien filed in this 
8 case asks for $2,115. And apparently from the beginning, the 
9 defendants are saying it's too high. The plaintiff comes to 
10 a point of acknowledging a math error and acknowledges it 
11 should be $2,040 because it's $75 too high. 
12 Different carpet measurers measure it differently. 
13 And as I say, four of them have come up with four different 
14 figures ranging from a high and a low to just $150 
15 difference. 
16 Now, for this total lawsuit, that seems almost 
17 insignificant. But to the defendants, it's not 
18 insignificant. You're talking about an allowance by Miles 
19 Construction of $1500 for a total project, and in a claim by 
20 the plaintiff for $2,040. And this figure lies between the 
21 two. And I recognize I have not left — I deliberately left 
22 off the taxes and the preparation fee that I think are 
23 appropriate sums. I just haven't included them on this 
24 I because I would think that when we get through, the $40 
25 | preparation and the sales tax need to be added onto this no 
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matter what figure the Court ultimately uses. 
And I don't think Dennis Vanderlinden was 
discredited in any way because he has been associated with 
his brother. But then neither is David Seare or Dean 
Chidester or the plaintiff. They're all very — as far as 
the Court can see, they were all four people trying to 
honestly tell what they thought it looked like to them. 
Now, with regard to the lien. That's a very 
important aspect of this case. The amount in the notice of 
lien is incorrect at $2,115. Even in the plaintiff's best 
view of it, it should be $2,040. I've said that the 
defendants were not the owners of the house at the time they 
asked the work to be done. But they had at that time a valid 
contract for purchasing, and nobody's presented the Court 
with a copy of that so I know whether it had been accepted by 
Miles Construction so that it was a binding contract between 
the parties. But in ruling, the Court kind of assumes that 
it was because it wound up being on November 24th an actual 
contract that was consummated. That doesn't mean it wasn't 
binding on the plaintiffs prior if the house had been 
appropriately finished as apparently they agreed on. We just 
don't know concerning what their negotiations were in that 
area. 
Now, the lien statute is there to protect anybody 
who, in this case the plaintiff, supplies something to that 
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1 house, but that it requires a bond. And we really don't know 
2 whether there was a bond in place in this case or not. The 
3 Court knows nobody's testified to no bond being in place, 
4 Miles Construction Company didn't want to be 
5 responsible because they had not made the contract. 
6 Don Smith didn't want to be responsible because he claimed he 
7 wasn't selling either vinyl or carpet, just doing a favor by 
8 persuading the plaintiff to do it. But the law still 
9 protects those people furnishing it. And so the Court's 
10 assuming there was no bond. Of course, I know as a practical 
11 matter that with most homes that are personally built, there 
12 are not bonds obtained for them even though the statute 
13 requires it. 
14 Now, the lien was filed within a reasonable period 
15 of time. January 19th was reasonable within the statutory 
16 time after the work was done on November 17th. The statute 
17 doesn't really require privity. Many times it's the 
18 contractor who subcontracts or who hires the work done, not 
19 the owner. But to protect those people who supply material 
20 and work on a job, the lien statute doesn't require there to 
21 be a privity. 
22 The current lien statute, and that's 38-1-7, and 
23 I'm not going to read the whole thing. Paragraph (2) does 
24 list those things, and I'm not going to read all of them that 
25 the plaintiff listed in there. It says the statement 
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1 containing the day; the reputed owner. If not the reputed 
2 owner, if you don't know that, the record owner. 
3 I believe that was correctly stated at the time. I 
4 think the plaintiff had enough interest — or the defendants 
5 had enough interest in it and the plaintiff had no 
6 association with the contractor/owner at the time. And that 
7 when he checked the lien to see — or check the county 
8 recorder and so onto see who was the owner, it was listed as 
9 the defendants. So I think he did that one properly. 
10 The name of the person by whom he was employed. I 
11 think that on the lien statute, he, of course, lists Stacey 
12 and Kristin Morgan, and the Court has found that to be 
13 incorrect, but I did find that he believed that they were the 
14 ones that hired him. 
15 Under (c), the time the first and last labor was 
16 performed* He does list the 15th and 17th of November. 
17 (d), description of the property. There is one 
18 there, and nobody has argued anything except that it's 
19 correct. 
20 (e), given considerable amount of argument about 
21 that. The signature of a lien claimant or his authorized 
22 agent, and an acknowledgment or certificate is required under 
23 Chapter 3, Title 57. Then the statement "No acknowledgment 
24 I or certificate is required for any notice after April 29th, 
25 11985, and before April 24th, 1989." So that last sentence 
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1 has no application to this case because no work was done, no 
2 lien was filed until after that period. So you're left with 
3 just the one statement, the signature of lien claimant or his 
4 authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate. 
5 It does show the authorized signature. It's got 
6 Floorcoverings by Certified Incorporated. It's got the 
7 secretary signature and seal, and you've got the authorized 
8 officer as Allen Delahunty, and then you've got it notarized. 
9 The Court understands that this is a deficient 
10 certificate there. It doesn't really enter that the 
11 information is true. I'm sure that's what the plaintiff 
12 intended. It does say "...who swore or affirmed to me that 
13 he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the 
14 document is truthful," and that he signed it on before of the 
15 corporation. I think that's deficient personally. But it is 
16 the notary, of course, saying that this officer said that to 
17 him. 
18 So I think there are three problems in the lien — 
19 notice of lien, and that's the ownership of the property, the 
20 amount requested. I'm not bothered by the fact that this 
21 parenthesis it says "owner" and in another set of parenthesis 
22 J it says "contractor." Those are standard documents that are 
23 I meant to have one or the other crossed out so that when you 
24 | sign them, you know who you're referring to. The fact that 
25 | it leaves them both there doesn't — the Court doesn't think 
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1 damages any. So I think it's a deficient notice of lien for 
2 those reasons. 
3 I think the amount has to be correctly stated. 
4 Now, I believe the plaintiff is entitled to be paid 
5 for unjust enrichment, and the Court is not persuaded of 
6 which of the four amounts submitted is better than another. 
7 Whether it should be the lower figure of Mr. Chidester of 
8 1725 or whether it should be the higher figure of the 
9 plaintiff of 1875. And so I think a good resolution of that 
10 is just order an amount right between those two figures which 
11 is probably $1800. That will be the order of the Court, plus 
12 the $40 preparation plus the sales tax. 
13 And I think because of the nature of what I've said 
14 about this, each party should bear their own attorney's fees. 
15 Anything else? 
16 MR. VANDERLINDEN: Did you want me — Excuse me. I'll 
17 stand up. I apologize. Do you want me to prepare the 
18 findings of fact and conclusions, your Honor? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. You can prepare them. 
20 MR. VANDERLINDEN: Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Do you have all the exhibits? 
22 Which ones do you or don't have? 
23 THE CLERK: I need Defendants' 3 and 5. 
24 THE REPORTER: Here you go. 
25 MR. VANDERLINDEN: I'll need a copy of his findings of 
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facts. 
THE COURT: Anything by either counsel before we be in 
adjournment? 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: Nothing on behalf of the defendant. 
MR. FARR: We have nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That's all. The 
Court will be adjourned. The clerk will see that she has all 
those documents before she quits. 
(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.) 
* * * * * 
£/2 Court Reoorter 1 & 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KELLY BROWN HICKEN, C.S.R., R.P.R. and Notary Public 
for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County, certify: 
That the proceedings were taken before me at the 
time and place herein set forth; 
That all proceedings had of record at the time of 
the proceeding were recorded stenographically by me and 
were thereafter transcribed into typewritten form by me, 
and I hereby certify that the foregoing typewritten 
transcript as typed by me is a full, true and correct 
record of my stenographic notes so taken; 
I further certify that I am neither counsel for 
nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise 
interested in the outcome thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this ? " ^ day of - N J ^ V X - Q 19 °\ \ . 
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KELLY B$OWN HICKEN, C.S.R., R.P.R., 
Notary Public. Notary Commission 
Expires on May 5, 1992 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS , STATUTES , ORDINANCES , 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules 
and Regulations whose interpretation is determinative to this 
appeal and are set forth in this brief are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1(2), (1953 as amended): 
"(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the 
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land is awarded to any 
contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor a 
payment bond complying with Subsection (3) . The bond shall 
become binding upon the award of the contract to the 
contractor."; 
2. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-7(2), (1953 as amended): 
Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of 
property. 
"(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth 
the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if 
not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed D 
to whom he furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or sendee 
was performed or the first and last equipment or material was 
furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized 
agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as required under 
Chapter 3, Title 57. No acknowledgment or certificate is 
required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before 
April 24, 1989."; 
3. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-17 (1953 as amended): 
"As between the owner and the contractor the court shall 
apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in 
all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his 
costs awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and 
recording the notice of claim of lien and such reasonable 
attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and recording 
said notice of claim of lien."; 
4. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-18 (1953 as amended): 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter 
the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action."; 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33: 
"(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any 
party or upon its own motion. A party may request 
damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's 
motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to 
a motion or other paper. . . ."; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(b)(c): 
"(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short 
and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall 
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party 
relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient 
to form a belief as to the truth or an averment, he shall so 
state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall 
fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a 
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a 
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it 
as it true and material and shall deny only the remainder. 
Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the 
averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials 
as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or 
he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he 
does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so 
by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 
11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding 
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, freiud, illegality, injury 
by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res 
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, 
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as 
a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on 
terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if 
there had been a proper designation.11; 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11: 
11
. . . A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his 
address. . . ."; and 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68(b): 
"(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days before 
the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve 
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken 
against him for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 
days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves 
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may 
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with 
proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be 
entered. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and 
evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to 
determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the 
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must 
pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The 
fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude 
a subsequent offer." 
